

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 211288

60

ORIGIN SS-20

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 ARA-16 EUR-25 EA-11 NEA-10 ISO-00 PCH-04

PRS-01 RSC-01 /099 R

66611

DRAFTED BY: S/S-O:KKURZE

APPROVED BY: S/S: HBARNES

----- 081383

O 260017Z OCT 73

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE

USLO PEKING IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY VALLETTA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BERN

AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

AMEMBASSY KIGALI

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY MBABANE

AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY BANJUL BY POUCH

AMEMBASSY SUVA BY POUCH

UNCLAS STATE 211288

PART ONE OF TWO

PART ONE IS MRN 211288. PART TWO IS MRN 211289

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, US

SUBJECT: TEXT OF THE SECRETARY'S OCTOBER 25 PRESS CONFERENCE.

WASHINGTON, OCT. 25--FOLLOWING IS THE OFFICIAL STATE DEPARTMENT

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 211288

TRANSCRIPT OF SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER'S OCTOBER 25

NEWS CONFERENCE:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, I THOUGHT THE

MOST USEFUL INTRODUCTION TO YOUR QUESTIONS WOULD BE A SUMMARY OF EVENTS BETWEEN OCTOBER 6 AND TODAY SO THAT YOU CAN EVALUATE OUR ACTIONS, THE SITUATION IN WHICH WE FIND OURSELVES, AND OUR FUTURE COURSE.

THE CRISIS FOR US STARTED AT 6 A.M. ON OCTOBER 6, WHEN I WAS AWAKENED WITH THE INFORMATION THAT ANOTHER ARAB-ISRAELI WAR WAS IN PROGRESS. I MENTION THIS PERSONAL DETAIL BECAUSE IT ANSWERS THE QUESTION THAT THE UNITED STATES INTERVENTION PREVENTED ISRAEL FROM TAKING PREEMPTIVE ACTION. THE UNITED STATES MADE NO DEMARCHE TO EITHER SIDE BEFORE OCTOBER 6 BECAUSE ALL THE INTELLIGENCE AT OUR DISPOSAL AND ALL THE INTELLIGENCE GIVEN TO US BY FOREIGN COUNTRIES SUGGESTED THAT THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF THE OUTBREAK OF A WAR. WE HAD NO REASON TO GIVE ANY ADVICE TO ANY OF THE PARTICIPANTS BECAUSE WE DID NOT BELIEVE -- NOR, MAY I SAY, DID THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT -- THAT AN ATTACK WAS IMMINENT.

IN THE THREE HOURS BETWEEN 6 A.M. AND 9 A.M., WE MADE MAJOR EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR BY ACTING AS AN INTER-MEDIARY BETWEEN THE PARTIES, OF ASSURING EACH OF THEM THAT THE OTHER ONE WAS ATTEMPTING TO OBTAIN THE ASSURANCE OF EACH SIDE THAT THE OTHER ONE HAD NO AGGRESSIVE INTENTION. BEFORE THIS PROCESS COULD BE COMPLETED, HOWEVER, WAR HAD BROKEN OUT. AND IT STARTED THE PROCESS IN WHICH WE ARE STILL ENGAGED.

I DO NOT THINK ANY USEFUL PURPOSE IS SERVED IN REVIEWING EVERY INDIVIDUAL DIPLOMATIC MOVE, BUT I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO INDICATE SOME OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES WE ATTEMPTED TO FOLLOW.

THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS THE PRESIDENT WAS CONVINCED THAT WE HAD TWO MAJOR PROBLEMS: FIRST, TO END HOSTILITIES AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE -- BUT, SECONDLY, TO END HOSTILITIES IN A MANNER THAT WOULD ENABLE US TO MAKE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO REMOVING THE CONDITIONS THAT HAVE PRODUCED FOUR WARS BETWEEN ARABS AND ISRAELIS IN THE LAST 25 YEARS.

WE WERE AWARE THAT THERE WERE MANY INTERESTED PARTIES. THERE WERE, OF COURSE, THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFLICT -- EGYPT AND SYRIA ON THE ARAB SIDE, AIDED BY MANY OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES; UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 211288

ISRAEL ON THE OTHER. THERE WAS THE SOVIET UNION. THERE WERE THE OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. AND, OF COURSE, THERE WAS THE UNITED STATES.

IT WAS OUR VIEW THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE IN BOTH THE TASKS OUTLINED BY THE PRESIDENT -- THAT IS, OF ENDING HOSTILITIES, AS WELL AS OF MAKING A CONTRIBUTION TO A PERMANENT PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST -- IF WE CONDUCTED OURSELVES SO THAT WE COULD REMAIN IN PERMANENT CONTACT WITH ALL OF THESE ELEMENTS IN THE EQUATION.

THROUGHOUT THE FIRST WEEK, WE ATTEMPTED TO CRYSTALLIZE A CONSENSUS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH WOULD BRING ABOUT A CEASE-FIRE ON TERMS THAT THE WORLD COMMUNITY COULD SUPPORT. WE STATED OUR BASIC PRINCIPLES ON OCTOBER 8TH. WE DID NOT SUBMIT

THEM TO A FORMAL VOTE BECAUSE WE REALIZED THAT NO MAJORITY WAS AVAILABLE AND WE DID NOT WANT SIDES TO BE CHOSEN PREMATURELY. ON OCTOBER 10TH, THE SOVIET UNION BEGAN AN AIRLIFT WHICH BEGAN FAIRLY MODERATELY BUT WHICH, BY OCTOBER 12TH, HAD ACHIEVED FAIRLY SUBSTANTIAL LEVELS.

LET ME SAY A WORD HERE ABOUT OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION THROUGHOUT THIS CRISIS AND WHAT WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO ACHIEVE. THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE, OF COURSE, IDEOLOGICAL AND, TO SOME EXTENT, POLITICAL ADVERSARIES. BUT THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ALSO HAVE A VERY SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY. WE POSSESS -- EACH OF US -- NUCLEAR ARSENALS CAPABLE OF ANNIHILATING HUMANITY. WE -- BOTH OF US -- HAVE A SPECIAL DUTY TO SEE TO IT THAT CONFRONTATIONS ARE KEPT WITHIN BOUNDS THAT DO NOT THREATEN CIVILIZED LIFE. BOTH OF US, SOONER OR LATER, WILL HAVE TO COME TO REALIZE THAT THE ISSUES THAT DIVIDE THE WORLD TODAY, AND FORESEEABLE ISSUES, DO NOT JUSTIFY THE UNPARALLELED CATASTROPHE THAT A NUCLEAR WAR WOULD REPRESENT. AND, THEREFORE, IN ALL OUR DEALINGS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO KEEP IN MIND AND WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO MOVE THEM TO A POSITION IN WHICH THIS OVERRIDING INTEREST THAT HUMANITY SHARES WITH US IS NEVER LOST SIGHT OF. IN A SPEECH -- PACEM IN TERRIS -- I POINTED OUT THAT THERE ARE LIMITS BEYOND WHICH WE CANNOT GO. I STATED THAT WE WILL OPPOSE THE ATTEMPT BY ANY COUNTRY TO ACHIEVE A POSITION OF PREDOMINANCE, EITHER GLOBALLY OR REGIONALLY; THAT WE WOULD RESIST ANY ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT A POLICY OF DETENTE TO WEAKEN OUR ALLIANCES; AND THAT WE WOULD REACT IF THE RELAXATIONS OF TENSIONS WERE USED AS A COVER TO EXACERBATE CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL TROUBLE SPOTS. UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 STATE 211288

WE HAVE FOLLOWED THESE PRINCIPLES IN THE CURRENT SITUATION. IT IS EASY TO START CONFRONTATIONS, BUT IN THIS AGE WE HAVE TO KNOW WHERE WE WILL BE AT THE END AND NOT ONLY WHAT POSE TO STRIKE AT THE BEGINNING. THROUGHOUT THE FIRST WEEK, WE ATTEMPTED TO BRING ABOUT A MODERATION IN THE LEVEL OF OUTSIDE SUPPLIES THAT WERE INTRODUCED INTO THE AREA AND WE ATTEMPTED TO WORK WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON A CASE-FIRE RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD BRING AN END TO THE CONFLICT. THIS FIRST ATTEMPT FAILED, ON SATURDAY, OCTOBER 13TH, FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS -- INCLUDING, PERHAPS, A MIS-ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY SITUATION BY SOME OF THE PARTICIPANTS. WE WERE THEN FACED WITH THE INABILITY TO PRODUCE A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION THAT WOULD COMMAND A CONSENSUS, AND THE SUBSTANTIAL INTRODUCTION OF ARMS BY AN OUTSIDE POWER INTO THE AREA. AT THIS POINT, ON SATURDAY, OCTOBER 13TH, THE PRESIDENT DECIDED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE TO START A RESUPPLY EFFORT OF ITS OWN. AND THE UNITED STATES, FROM THAT TIME ON, HAS ENGAGED IN MAINTAINING THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT THAT WE HAD SOUGHT. CONCURRENTLY WITH THIS, WE INFORMED THE SOVIET UNION THAT OUR INTEREST IN WORKING OUT AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION STILL REMAINED VERY STRONG, AND THAT AS PART OF THIS SOLUTION, WE WERE PREPARED

TO DISCUSS A MUTUAL LIMITATION OF ARMS SUPPLY INTO THE AREA.
IN THE DAYS THAT FOLLOWED, THE SOVIET UNION AND WE DISCUSSED
VARIOUS APPROACHES TO THIS QUESTION, THE BASIC DIFFICULTY BEING
HOW TO RECONCILE THE ARAB INSISTENCE ON AN IMMEDIATE COMMITMENT
TO A RETURN TO THE 1967 BORDERS WITH ISRAELI INSISTENCE ON
SECURE BOUNDARIES AND A NEGOTIATED OUTCOME.
AS YOU ALL KNOW, ON OCTOBER 16, PRIME MINISTER KOSYGIN WENT
TO CAIRO TO WORK ON THIS POBLEM WITH THE LEADERS OF EGYPT.
HE RETURNED TO THE SOCIET UNION ON OCTOBER 19TH.
WE BEGAN EXPLORING A NEW FORMULA FOR ENDING THE WAR THAT
EVENING, THOUGH IT WAS STILL UNACCEPTABLE TO US. AND WHILE
WE WERE STILL CONSIDERING TH

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 11 MAY 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PFOR
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 26 OCT 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: n/a
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: n/a
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment:
Disposition Date: 01 JAN 1960
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973STATE211288
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: S/S-O:KKURZE
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19731066/abqcejgx.tel
Line Count: 174
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: n/a
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: thigpegh
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 02 JAN 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <02-Jan-2002 by bryansd0>; APPROVED <30-Jan-2002 by thigpegh>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: TEXT OF THE SECRETARY'S OCTOBER 25 PRESS CONFERENCE.
TAGS: US
To: ABU DHABI
MANAMA
NOUAKCHOTT
PEKING
SANAA
VALLETTA
BERN

BRIDGETOWN
DUBLIN
KIGALI
LUXEMBOURG
MBABANE
PORT LOUIS
REYKJAVIK
BANJUL BY POUCH
SUVA BY POUCH

Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005